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1.2 Abbreviations and Terms
English

French

AU/OAU: African Union/
Organization of African Unity

Tournante: Rotating
presidency established by 2001
Constitution

Ngazidja: Grande Comore

CENI: Conseil Electorale
Nationale Independante

Mwali: Moheli

UN: United Nations
UNGA: United Nations
General Assembly
UNSC: United Nations
Security Council
LAS/AL: League of Arab
States/ Arab League

CTOM: Collectivite Territoire
d’Outre Mer
TOM: Territoire d’Outre Mer
DOM: Départements d'outremer
OIF: Organisation
Internationale de la
Fracophonie
ICO: Indian Ocean
Commission/ Commission
l'Océan Indien (COI)
DGSE: Directorate-General
for External Security, French
intelligence agency

Comorian

Ndzwani: Anjoaun

Maore: Mayotte
Wakabaila: nobles/aristocracy
of Arab descent
Wamatsaha: peasants, farmers,
lower classes predominantly of
Malagasy or Bantu descent
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1.3 Abstract
Since its independence in 1975 the Union of Comoros has seen a great deal of political upheaval as a
part of its decolonization process. This study examines the period between 1975 and 2001 with
special emphasis on the 1997 Secession Crisis and the methods by which that crisis was resolved.
The literature review is composed of predominantly native Comorian authors, supplemented by
several French authors and information from international organizations. The events and literature
are also examined through the lenses of the psychoanalytical group identity theory of Vamik Volkan
and the Conflict Transformation work of Johan Galtung. Data regarding attitudes and general
knowledge of this period in Comorian history was obtained through a qualitative study conducted
with forty participants from across Comoros. The findings suggested that the majority of responses
from the island of Anjoaun showed a greater knowledge and personal connection to the events of
1997, while many Grande Comoriens were either not aware of or had forgotten about the crisis. The
findings also indicated that Anjoaunese participants were more likely to believe there was a tension
or conflict between the islands than their Grande Comorien counterparts. The literature review
findings indicated that Comoros is in a period of relative political stability and has begun the
establishing political norms regarding free and fair elections which can be directly attributed to the
2001 Constitution.
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1.4 Introduction
The latter half of the twentieth century saw many former colonial territories of European
powers gain independence, many through bloodshed. The Comorian Archipelago’s bloodless 1974
referendum marked it apart from the conflicts seen by other former French territories but that did
not guarantee an easy transition into sovereignty. The Comorian state has weathered almost two
dozen coup d’etats, some led by internal actors and others by a core group of mercenaries. The
urban/rural divides, typified by subtle ethnic distinctions and historical class roles have split
elements of Comorian society against each other for decades. The international community has
intervened multiple times to ensure the appropriate transition of power and to offer meditative
solutions to the political tensions between the islands.
This research project will first present a timeline of the general events and actors involved in
the first twenty years of Comorian independence. By using a literature composed of predominantly
Comorian authors and their often-disparate views on the importance of different events the author
has blended them in with a smaller selection of reports published through the African Union, the
United Nations, and several academic articles detailing the time period. After the literature review to
establish a timeline and context for a relatively unknown case study the project will use those works
to supplement the quantitative analysis obtained through the authors interviews and then the totality
of the work will be analyzed through the lens of Vamik Volkan’s Large Group Identity Theory and
Johann Galtung’s 3R’s. Volkan’s work will be used to analyze some of the psychological and cultural
markers between the islands and some of the potential causes for disparity in the responses to the
survey questions. Galtung’s work has been useful in evaluating the different stages of how the 2001
constitution was written. Furthermore, this study has compared the texts of the five distinct
Comorian constitutions and constitutional charters. In analyzing those texts against the established
timeline light can be shed on some of the historic tensions between islands and autonomous groups.
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The interviews associated with this study have been used to collect a small sample
population of attitudes towards the actions of France in the Comorian decolonization process. Due
to the ages of most candidates the questions focused less on the events immediately after
independence but rather on the opinions and a priori knowledge regarding the new constitution.
1.5 Geographic Information

(CIA World Factbook)
Located in the Mozambique Channel between the Tanzanian coast and northern Madagascar
the Comorian archipelago has been influenced by Bantu settlers from the African continent, Arab
traders and missionaries, Malagasy pirates, and finally English and French colonizers (Chami-Allaoui
et al, 1997) Approximately the same size as the American state of Rhode Island, the archipelago
most notable for its coral reefs surrounding the island of Moheli and Karthala, the largest active
volcano in the world, located in the center of Grande Comore.
The islands only deep-water port is found in Anjoaunese capital of Mutsamudu where
imported goods are rerouted to Grande Comore on smaller ships. Said Sheikh Mohammed Airport
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in Hahaya, Grande Comore, is the only international airport in the country; however occasionally
regional companies like AB Aviation will offer special flights from Anjouan to Mahajanga,
Madagascar.
Section 2: Literature Review
2.1 The Colonial Period and 1974 Referendum
It is unclear exactly when the Comorian archipelago was settled and by who. The
archaeological record seems to show that each island was settled at different times by different
groups (Chami-Allaoui, 1997.) Arab traders knew of the islands, dubbing Mayotte “Jizr al-Mowt,”
Arabic for the “Island of Death” for its treacherous reefs. Some time in the seventh or eighth
centuries missionaries introduced Islam and gradually established small sultanates among the islands
(Chanfi Ahmed, 1994). The island of Mayotte was the first of the four to be formally colonized in
1841 when France purchased the territory from a local king (Hassani el Barwane, 2015). Over the
following decades the remaining three islands were colonized and the entire archipelago was
incorporated as a French territory in the province of Madagascar in 1912 (ibid.) Comorians fought
for France in both world wars and many of those veterans moved to the metropoles. Current
estimates place roughly 200,000 Comorians in France, many descended from the “tirailleurs”
(sharpshooters) who moved to Marseille after their service (Halifa, 2009). This population base in
France has proven hugely influential to contemporary Comorian politics, especially in the era
immediately following Comoros’ unilateral declaration of independence in 1975.
Although the archipelago had been granted autonomous rule in the 1950’s the independence
movement built up steam throughout the entirety of the autonomous period. Prominent figures like
Prince Said Mohammed Cheikh and future President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane pushed the
French government for a definitive timeline on ending French rule, eventually agreeing in 1973 that
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Comoros would gain independence in 1976. However, the deaths of both Said Mohammed Cheikh
and Georges Pompidou in the early 1970’s led to the derailment of the process. On December 22nd,
1974 a referendum on independence was held across the four Comorian islands. The clear majority
of voters chose to leave French rule, but of the 12,390 recorded votes on Mayotte 8,091 chose not
to leave France (Mattoir, 2004). It is the results of that initial vote that resonates with Comorians to
this day. However the various political and cultural reasons surrounding Mayotte’s decision to
remain with France is outside the scope of this research.
Although the Comorian archipelago was administered as an autonomous entity consisting of
four islands the French government decided to interpret the results of the vote island by island- thus
nullifying the overall results and keeping Mayotte as a CTOM. This division of territory has a shaky
legal foundation. Article 53 of the French constitution states “No ceding, exchanging or acquiring of
territory shall be valid without the consent of the population concerned.” (Constitute Project) This
clause was used to argue that Mayotte voted independently and thus would be judged independently.
This goes against statements made by high-ranking French officials like Olivier Stern, French
secretaire d’etat a l’Outre Mer, from 1974 to 1978. When asked about the territorial integrity of
Comoros Stirn responded
“… because in the terms of international law, a territory retains the same frontiers it had as a colony… and finally
it is not the role of France to foster in Comoros people one against the other; on the contrary [France’s] role is to
facilitate coming together between the two to find an appropriate legal solution.” (Mattoir, 2004)

Factors specific to intra-Comorian relations as well as French objectives led the majority of
Mahorais to vote the way they did. A more detailed analysis of those influences will be discussed in
section 4 through the lens of Vamik Volkan’s work on group identity theory.
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2.2 Ali Soilihi’s Revolution
The aftermath of the initial referendum in 1974 led Comoros to unilaterally declare independence
from France on July 6th, 1975. French officials were expelled from Comoros while the security of
Mayotte was placed under heavy scrutiny. Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, one of the chief architects
of the vote, was elected President of the young federation. Within a month of Abdallah taking the
mantle of the presidency, he was usurped by Prince Said Mohammed Djaffar and exiled to France
(Mattoir, 2004.) Djaffar’s claim wouldn’t last long as he was quickly deposed by his Minster of
Defense, Ali Soilihi.
While Abdallah and Djaffar did not hold office long enough to pursue any sort of agenda or
establish a doctrine Ali Soilihi moved to hastily cement himself in the presidential palace, Beit-Salam.
Envisioning a Marxist revolution Soilihi passed a new constitution reflecting his own brand of
socialism, without seeking support, ideological or otherwise, from the Soviet Union or China (Said
Abdillah, 2011). Soilihi’s constitution was unique amongst the various iterations in Comorian
history. The voting age was lowered to fifteen and the role of Islam was greatly diminished within
the government (Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Soilihi attempted to entrench his power with the youth,
the largest demographic group, promising to stimulate development projects and increase gender
and social equality. Of the sixteen members of the National Popular Committee, all were in their last
year of secondary school (Mattoir, 2004).
One of Soilihi’s most difficult undertakings was trying to eliminate the Anda or “Grande
Marriage” ceremony. As mentioned n the authors earlier writings on Comoros, the Anda is a dearly
held but extremely controversial subject within Comoros where the wealthiest members of society
on Grande Comore will spend tens of thousands of euros on an elaborate marriage ceremony.
Current estimates (2016) put the average cost between 20,000-100,000 euros. This was yet another
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iteration of the conflict between the wakabaila and wamatsaha. The wealthy Moroni elite, as well as
the significant Comorian population in Marseille, conspired with Bob Denard to remove Soilihi
from office (Halifa, 2009). Soilihi’s pseudo-socialism jeopardized the financial dominance of the
elites and their way of life, and as such, this period saw the exodus of many wealthy Comorians to
France and Madagascar.
While many of Soilihi’s policies were ill advised and hastily implemented he has been cast in
an extremely negative light in contemporary Comorian literature. His willingness to move away from
the deeply rooted Islamic heritage of the islands was viewed as a betrayal to the islands culture. Even
the Comorian flag of the Soilihi period attempted to subvert the influence of Islam. The red bar
representing the revolution was made larger and placed above the green bar that past and future
flags used to represent Comoros’ attachment to the color of the prophet (Halifa, 2009). The
common thread throughout all the available literature is that Soilihi betrayed something essential to
the Comorian identity. In the terms Vamik Volkan’s Group Identity Theory, Soilihi insulted the
shared reservoirs of images and traditions that many Comorians consider integral to their identity as
not only Muslims, but the specific traditions of Comorian Chaifite Islam.
Landing on Itsandra beach with a small but highly trained force in the middle of the night on
May 12th 1978, Bob Denard once again seized control of Comoros. This time however he was in for
the long haul. Changing his name to Said Mustapha, converting to Islam, and marrying a Comorian
woman, Denard set out to disguise his de facto power within the Comorian government (Mattoir,
2004). Ahmed Abdallah went through the streets of Moroni with his accomplices proclaiming “Vive
l’amitie franco-comorienne” and “Vive l’Islam!” (Mattoir, 2004). Within two weeks Ali Soilihi had
been caught, allegedly assassinated by order of the newly restored council of ministers. Ahmed
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Abdallah reclaimed the title of president and named Bob Denard as commander of the 500 strong
Presidential Guard.
2.3 The Mercenary Regime
Abdallah’s new regime immediately nullified Soilihi’s constitution in a dramatic reversal.
Islam was again paramount in Comorian society- at least on the surface. A few of the key changes
made to the ruling structure of Comoros were changing the voting age back to 18, set up
autonomous governorships, and set in place a mechanism by which to secure the power of the
presidency. The 1978 constitution made sure that the supreme court, national council, and island
councils were staffed with enough loyalists to maintain control. The president not only selected his
own Prime Minister but also had a great deal of influence in selecting the Supreme Court and
National Council. Functionaries nominated by the president had a disproportionate amount of
power to the governors and the elected legislative councils on each island. Section II Article 10
states that those functionaries are embedded into the island’s government to insure “the direction of
federal services.” (Digitheque-MJP, 2012).
The constitution of 1978 is markedly different than Soilihi’s 1977 in that it very clearly
delineates the powers and topics administered by federal or regional jurisdiction. The federal
government’s roles were numerous, with each island being predominantly responsible for their own
budget. Between 40% and 60% of each islands revenue was due to the federal government “It divides
the remainder among the islands in proportion to the population of each, without any being able to receive less than a
tenth of this balance.” (Digitheque-MJP, 2012) Obviously with Grande Comore having the largest
population and being the seat of federal power, this clause was viewed as an overreach by the
President.
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The reign of Abdallah and Denard was fraught with political intrigue both inter and
intranational. Though it is impossible to know the exact number there were roughly a dozen coup
attempts against the mercenary regime between 1978 and 1989. Over the years dozens of civil
service members, military personnel, and even foreign nationals were arrested or killed trying to
overthrow the president and his guard (Caminade, 2010). But Abdallah’s actual role during his
tenure as president is up for debate. Abdallah returned to power with the assistance of a French
trained mercenary and his troops. Within a year of Abdallah’s return Comoros had signed three
military treaties with France, going so far as to allow a French military base on Comorian soil
(Caminade 2010). Overtures were made to Arab states as well as the Apartheid regime in South
Africa, international hotels were built in Moroni and Mitsamihouli (Perri, 1994)
Denard’s connection to apartheid South Africa is pointed to by Comorian authors like
Said Abdillah, Fatouma Halifa, Nakidine Mattoir and others as proof that Denard was actively
working for the French government. Comoros did not participate in the embargo on South Africa,
on the contrary the island nation would import Iranian petrol which would then be immediately sold
to Pretoria (Perri, 1994). South African airlines, lacking refueling stations between Europe and South
Africa were limited to Malawi and Comoros (Bakar 1988). The severe lack of economic partners led
South Africa to invest heavily into Comoros to compensate. South Africa’s regional strategies in
Mozambique and Angola were also hugely controversial and the published literature regarding South
African clandestine activities will be addressed in the conclusion of this paper.
Once it became apparent in the late 1980’s that the end of apartheid was approaching
Denard himself worried about the financial ramifications to his regime. In an interview with a
journalist from Figaro, Denard confided that “since last year [South Africa’s] minister of foreign
affair won’t finance us anymore. Then, the minister of defense began to reduce his contribution. For
1990, the Comorian budget has had to take over from South Africa.” (Mattoir, 2004).
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While Denard claimed simply to be an anti-communist mercenary who decided to settle
down in Comoros the larger picture is much more sinister. Even though the Constitution of the
mercenary period reaffirms Comoros’ claim over Mayotte the Comorian government worked closely
with France militarily and economically. With Denard conducting business and diplomacy with
political entities off limits to official French diplomats, e.g. those in Tehran or Pretoria, those
diplomats were a half hour flight away. This arrangement was not to last however. With the
imminent regime change in South Africa and Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane’s paranoia reaching its
zenith Denard’s tenure came to abrupt end in 1989.
Worried that Denard was going to assassinate him, Ahmed Abdallah had been plotting to
remove Denard and replace him with a more easily controlled loyalist. Pik Botha, the South African
Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that President Abdallah had reached out to him in 1987
seeking to dismiss Denard (Mattoir, 2004). It wasn’t enough to save him, on November 26th 1989
President Abdallah was shot to death while in a private meeting with Bob Denard (Perri, 1994).
Although Denard was in the room at the time he claimed not to have fired the shots that killed the
president, instead Denard claimed that the assassin was former commandant Ahmed Mohammed
who held a personal grudge against Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane for his dismissal (Mattoir, 2004).
The accounts given by Denard loyalists varied in regards to the murder weapon and the exact details
of the assassination. It is the widely held belief in Comoros that if Denard didn’t pull the trigger
himself but that he gave the order.
2.5 The Post-Mercenary Regime Power Consolidation and Tension
The aftermath of Abdallah’s death was a hectic scramble for the Comorian power
structure. Denard was extradited to South Africa within days by French paratroopers, eventually
making his way back to France. Supreme court judge Said Mohammed Djohar, the brother of
former President Ali Soilihi, took the presidency for himself the day after President Abdallah’s death
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(Mattoir, 2004). The early 1990’s realigned global attitudes to South Africa and to communism,
severely diminishing the interest larger international actors had in the Comorian archipelago.
Thus, President Djohar began the process of ruling a Comorian state that had been under
the despotic rule of President Abdallah and his mercenary cohort. Djohar legalized the formation of
political parties, reversing Abdallah’s 1982 decree that had established the Union Comorien de Progress
(Comorian Union for Progress) (UCP) as the sole party (Perri, 1994). Djohar also spearheaded a
constitutional referendum with the goal of redistributing power from the executive-centric model
under Abdallah. The constitution was largely the same as under Abdallah with the key distinction of
establishing a bi-cameral legislature to replace the national council of the previous regime
(Digitheque-MJP, 2012).
Regardless of President Djohar’s intentions or the monumental undertaking he attempted,
his presidency was plagued with unrest and instability. Between his official election in 1990 and the
Denard-led coup that ousted him in 1995, Said Mohammed Djohar changed parliaments seventeen
times (Caminade, 2010). In a country accustomed to efficient and often bloody responses to
attempted coups, Djohar had a comparable number to Abdallah in less than half the time.
Said Mohamed Djohar was the last Comorian president to be removed from office by Bob
Denard. On September 28th, 1995, Bob Denard quickly deposed Djohar with a small contingent of
loyalists and established a temporary military government (Halifa, 2009). However, the international
community quickly condemned the mercenary and French paratroopers took Denard and his top
lieutenants into custody by October 5th (Ibid.) Djohar had weathered the coup on nearby Seychelles
and was reinstated as president late January the following year. Lacking the support and mandate to
rule, Djohar lost the presidential elections held in March of 1996 to his former Prime Minister Taki
Abdulkarim.
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2.6 The 1997 Crisis and the Time of Two Colonels
Bob Denard’s long and illustrious career in personally leading coups in Comoros came to an
end in October of 1995. After Djohar’s loss to Mohammed Taki Abdulkarim in 1996, Taki set out
with a single goal in mind: solidifying his control of the presidency. A high-ranking official under
both Abdallah and Djohar, Taki had had ample opportunities to learn how to quell dissent. Bob
Denard and his cohort had deposed and/or killed all his predecessors and Taki was keen not to
suffer the same fate. On October 20th, 1996 Taki pushed a new constitution through the supreme
court and legislature. Going further than Djohar or Abdallah ever did on paper, Taki’s constitution
flagrantly consolidated all available political mechanisms to be under his control.
Article 20 of the 1996 document details that the president may, in a state of national
emergency or interruption of regular government function may, with the approval of the prime
minister, governors, federal assembly, and national council, be allowed sweeping powers necessary
to the operation of the state. Article 45 then states that a state of emergency may technically only last
for more than 15 days except under “exigent circumstances” and refers itself back to article 20. The
main ethical qualm to this system is then that the President personally appoints four of the ten
members pf the national council (Article 49) as well as handpicking the island governors (Article 60)
(Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Taki also incorporated an “Ulema” Council composed of religious leaders
to advise the government on spiritual matters. In this it seems that Taki was taking the next step
with Abdallah’s conservative policies to boost his support among the religious community. It also
marked the first time that such a group was written into a Comorian constitution.
Taki’s monopolization of power did not go unnoticed. The wealthy Anjoaunese, who had
enjoyed their pick of top administrative posts under the Domoni, Anjoun, born President Abdallah,
began to feel marginalized by Taki’s Ngazidja centric policies. Taki’s supporters rallying cry “Yinu
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nde yezi ya hatru!” or “our power for us” set the clear goal of using Ngazidja’s larger population and
land mass to claim the dominance it felt it was owed (Halifa, 2009). Salaries for civil servants on
Anjoaun and Moheli fell into arrears and a general teacher’s strike was called. Anjoaunese radio
stations and newspapers began pushing a hardline anti-Ngazidja position.
On July 14th, 1997, Anjoaunese political leaders under the leadership of Fundi Abdallah
Ibrahim, a respected religious leader from Mutsamudu, called for reattachment to France. Despite
waving the tricolore flag on Bastille Day every French statement reaffirmed Comorian sovereignty and
condemnation of the separatist movement. The situation became even more complex on August 3rd,
1997 when Abdallah Ibrahim declared himself president of an independent Anjoaun, unilaterally
seceding from the union (Halifa, 2009). The OAU sent Ambassador Pierre Yere as an independent
observer to Moroni within the week (Said Abdillah, 2011) It quickly became evident that President
Taki underestimated the resolve of the Anjoaunese separatists. On September 3rd an initial attempt
to send a small force from Ngazidja into Mutsamudu and restore order led to a violent clash which
left more than fifty dead in two days (Ibid.)
With that bloody clash it quickly became apparent that this crisis was not going to have a
simple solution. When Mayotte voted to remain with France in the 1970’s the language used focused
on the French culpability and influence. The Anjoaun crisis in 1997 saw the introduction of the
word “secession” to the Comorian national dialogue. Violence changed the dynamic and reinforced
negative stereotypes between the islands. The challenges of this crisis to the group identities of
Grande Comore and Anjouan will be discussed in detail in section 4.1b.
The Arab League, OAU, and international community at large denounced the Anjoaunese
separatists. Mohammed Ahmad Khandazar, an Arab League mediator, attempted to resolve the
burgeoning crisis but his efforts fell on deaf ears and an Anjoaunese referendum held on October
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26th had a 99% vote in favor of independence (Halifa, 2009). The OAU effected sanctions against
the Anjoaunese separatists on November 1st and officially condemned them on November 7th (Ibid.)
The following year would only exacerbate tensions between the islands. The French government,
hoping to avoid embarrassment, distanced themselves from the crisis. French ambassador to
Comoros, Gaston le Paudert claimed that France had no interest in annexing Anjoaun “We want to
maintain the unity of the federation of Comoros” (Caminade, 2010).
After the initial attempts by the LAS failed to contain the situation and OAU sanctions did
not deter the Anjoaunese separatists the internal politics of Comoros took a turn for the worse.
President Taki accused France of supporting and leading Abdallah Ibrahim’s government. Internal
divisions began within the separatists, with more militaristic elements beginning to coopt the
movement. Throughout 1998 the OAU pushed for a diplomatic solution and a joint commission
with representatives from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mauritius,
and Kenya facilitated a negotiation with representatives of Taki’s regime and the separatist
movements from Anjouan and Moheli from March 18 to the 20th (Said Abdillah, 2011). Although
the Anjoaunese delegation participated in the talks they rejected the agreement, the Mohelien
representatives agreed to return to jurisdiction of the Moroni-led government (Caminade, 2010).
On November 6th, returning from a state visit to several European and Arab states, Taki
Abdulkarim allegedly died of a heart attack (Said Abdillah, 2011). Because of issues with transporting
his body and his piety, Taki was never autopsied. Accusations and rumors of a French assassination
plot persist to this day. Tajiddine Ben Said Massound, president of the constitutional court, assumed
the title of interim president the following day. (Ibid.)
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2.7 The Time of Two Colonels
Massound, born in the Anjoaunese city of Domoni, was immediately plagued with
suspicions that he would be too pro-Anjouan to represent Grande Comore and Moheli. He did little
to assuage those fears and immediately nominated an overwhelmingly Anjoaunese cabinet (Ibid.)
Massound never truly convinced his constituents on Moheli and Grande Comore that he was going
to represent their interests. On April 30th, 1999, Massound was deposed in a coup led by Colonel
Azali Assoumani who established a military junta to oversee the islands.
Before Azali had deposed Massound another round of reconciliation had taken place in
Antananarivo, Madagascar April 19th to 23rd 1998 (Caminade, 2010). While the Anjoaunese
delegation again refused to sign the brokered agreement, it built on the previous mediative attempts
and solidified several key negotiating points. The imbalance of power was acknowledged, and the
agreement mandated restructuring term limits and representation in an equitable manner. Though
the 1999 document did not offer any permanent solutions it did choose the name that Comoros
would adopt at the resolution of the crisis: The Union of Comorian Islands. This name is significant
considering that the Anjoaunese delegation fervently pushed for several variations of the “United
States of Comoros” (Said Abdillah, 2011). Overseen by the UN, LAS, and OAU, the talks were an
instrumental step in setting the framework required to move forward.
Colonel Azali wasted no time in cementing his power during the remainder of 1999.
Nullifying President Taki’s 1996 constitution Azali passed a constitutional charter on May 6th in
which he claimed immense personal power (Digitheque-MJP, 2012). Condemned by the
international community at large, Comoros came under sanction by the European Union and United
States of America.
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The OAU appointed Francisco Madeira, a former ambassador from Mozambique, as special
envoy, replacing his predecessor Ambassador Yere, in August 1999. Madeira attempted to hold
another round of negotiations in late October but made no headway past what had been agreed in
Antananarivo earlier that year. In response to the failed round of talks the separatist government on
Anjouan held another independence referendum on January 23rd, 2000 (Said Abdillah). Over 60% of
voters chose independence. However, the vote’s legitimacy was immediately questioned. Fearing
that the negotiations were not productive the OAU joined the international community in
sanctioning Anjoaun on February 1st which degraded into an embargo as of March 1st (Caminade
2010).
Bowing to the pressure of the sanctions representatives from Azali’s regime and the
Anjoaunese separatist’s new leader, Lt. Colonel Abderemane Said Abeid, an agreement was reached
for reconciliation between the islands. Mediated by Francisco Madeira and OIF special envoy Andre
Salifou, the General Agreement on National Reconciliation, or Fomboni Accords, on February 21st, 2001.
The Accords set the timetable for the drafting of a new constitution and holding new elections. A
tripartite commission consisting of Azali’s regime, Abeid’s representatives, and a collection of civil
servants from across the islands, each consisting of the same number of representatives ratified the
Accords (UN Peacemaker, 2001).
The Fomboni Accords established several submissions authorized to not only hold
referendums but also set out to collect weapons and reintegrate potentially radicalized youths. While
there was a limited amount of direct conflict the multi-year crisis had seen several violent clashes in
Anjoaun. A constitutional referendum was held on December 23rd, 2001, working within the
framework of the Fomboni Accords to create what is known as the “Tournante,” or rotating
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presidency. Roughly 75% of voters approved the 2001 constitution. Col. Azali temporarily stepped
down as president to win the second round in the election on April 14th, 2002 (Said Abdillah, 2011).
2.8 The First Two Elections
With the establishment of the Tournante the territorial integrity of Comoros had been
restored. However, the leaders of the two largest islands were Colonel Azali, who gained power in a
military coup, and newly elected Anjoaunese vice-president Colonel Mohammed Abou Bacar, who
had taken over from Lt. Colonel Abeid in a coup shortly before the election. With two French trained
military men at the helm, Comoros gradually normalized relations between the islands. The
Tournante guaranteed a higher degree of autonomy to each island and the fragile union progressed
with close supervision of the newly rebranded African Union. On December 20th 2003 the Agreement
on the Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros or “Beit Salam Agreement,” was a final step in
solidifying how the Tournante would be carried out. The Beit Salam Agreement created a
“Harmonization Committee” chaired by representatives of the international community to
harmonize “customs norms and structures as well as economic data.” (Beit Salam Agreement, 2003)
Considering how one of Anjouan’s chief accusations against Grande Comore was the unequal
allocation of resources, the codification of such norms went a long way to solidifying the Tournante.
The initial terms of Azali and the island presidents concluded without major incident. The
AU’s military observer mission and the direct diplomacy of AU chair and former South African
President Thabo Mbeki tried to smooth the way for free and fair elections in 2006/2007. As set out
by the Tournante, Azali Assoumani represented Grande Comore for the first round of the
Tournante. As mandated in the new constitution, the president in the 2006 constitution was to be
selected from Anjoaun. Under the supervision of the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in
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the Comoros (AMISEC) roughly 450 military and police personnel and 60 election observers from
nine countries were deployed to ensure free and fair elections (Svensson, 2009)
On May 14th 2006, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi was came to power as arguably the first
democratically elected President in Comorian history. The following year each island held their
independent elections to determine the island presidents. Mohammed Abu Bacar was re-elected as
the president of Anjouan but the constitutional court declared the islands election as invalid on June
18th 2007, claiming Bacar had stuffed ballot boxes and intimidated voters (Mmadi, 2014). After
clashes between government troops and Bacar’s security services resulting in two deaths, the islands
once again settled into a stalemate (Svensson, 2008). The following year on February 28th, 2008, the
AU Mission in Comoros deployed around 1,300 hundred military personnel to assist Sambi’s
government to oust Bacar in “Operation Democracy in Comoros” (Ibid.) The junta quickly fell and
Bacar himself fled to Mayotte where he was intercepted by French forces and extradited first to
Reunion and eventually Ghana. Despite coming under criticism from the Comorian government for
refusing to turn over Colonel Bacar the French government cited Comoros’ position on capital
punishment to as a justification. Some have posited that Bacar was a French agent throughout his
tenure as Anjoaunese president but there is no proof of these allegations.
Although Bacar still has a cadre of supporters on Anjouan his ouster in 2008 has marked a
turning point in Comorian politics. Sambi relinquished power at the end of his term to Mohelien
candidate Ikililou Dhoinine, completing a full cycle of the Tournante. Azali Assoumani was reelected
in May of 2016. All of these elections, as well as the staggered elections for island presidents, have
been deemed (for the most part) free and fair by international observers and CENI officials. As
discussed in the Inquiry Findings section below, the Tournante has been effective in reunifying the
country and establishing a precedent for transitions of power. However, as remarked upon by
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several interview candidates the current system has some potential drawbacks in the middle and
long-term.
One interesting note regarding Sambi’s election and eventual victory over Col. Bacar is the
notable class divide between the two men. Mohammed Bacar was born in Barakani, a medium sized
agricultural village in the north of Anjouan. Throughout Bacar’s career in the Comorian gendarmerie
he became police chief and eventually used that power to take control of the entire island. Contrast
that to the political career of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, born as a scion of a rich and influential family
of preachers in the heart of Anjoaun’s capital city Mutsamudu, Sambi was a born and bred kabaila.
Sambi’s biography attempts to distance him from the trappings of wealth and influence he was born
with and instead focuses on his extensive studies in religion and starting his own political party
(Mmadi, 2014). However, Fatouma Nassour’s research on the rift between the two men points to a
degree of class resentment as a part of the rift between the men. The same can be said of Azali
Assoumani’s relationship with Sambi and other elements of the higher classes in Comoros. Azali is
famous for being one of the only major political players in Comorian politics past or present not to
have had a Grande Marriage ceremony. The class divides are rooted in the sultanate period of
Comorian history and cannot be explored further, yet remain fascinating in their manifestations.
Section 3: Inquiry Design and Findings
3.1 Structure of the Literature Review
The literature review of this paper set out to collect Comorian voices on the struggles
surrounding the decolonization process. Although there exists a limited amount of available
information on the Comorian independence referendums and subsequent challenges the author has
collected as many diverse relevant narratives as possible. However, there is a distinct lack of
information from Comorian voices available in English. The published Francophone literature has
been paired with UN reports, AU reports, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles to establish a
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context and timeline for the analysis of the collected data. Works on group identity theory and
conflict resolution were also utilized to provide additional lens by which to view the subject material.
The literature is also instrumental in allowing for Comorian voices and opinions on topics that were
not possible to conduct surveys on for both security concerns and the unavailability of suitably aged
participants. The full text of the survey question are attached in section 6.1 Appendix A.
In analyzing the collected data, the author will present the information in two sections.
Questions from section one are formatted on the Likert scale and the aggregate information will be
divided into several demographic groups. Through this division differences in public opinion can be
quantitatively reviewed based on age, gender, location, and education. Section two of the survey
form is predominantly qualitative and seeks more personalized responses to questions specifically
concerning methods of receiving information as well as opinions regarding tensions between the
islands. Data from section two will be reviewed by the researcher and divided into groups based on
the similarity of responses. With participant approval the researcher will translate and use relevant
quotations to supplement written sources.
3.2 Quantitative Surveys

Quantitative Survey Framework
Projected number of participants: 40

Final number of participants: 40

Locations:

Locations:

•

•

•

Grande Comore: 20 total, 10 male/10
female, 10 urban/10 rural (ex. 5 rural
males/ 5 urban males) Age and
education information will be averaged
Anjoaun: 20 total, 10 male/10 female,
10 urban/10 rural (ex. 5 rural males/ 5
urban males) Age and education
information will be averaged

•

Grande Comore: 20 participants
o 12 Men/8 Women
o 12 Rural/8 Urban
o Average age: 32.5
o Average Male age: 32
o Average female age: 33
o Age range: 22-73
Anjoaun: 20 participants
o 9 Men/11 Women
o 10 Rural/10 Urban
o Average age: 40.6
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o Average Male age: 42.5
o Average Female age: 38.9
o Age range: 24-49
3.3 Limitations
The researcher acknowledges several key limitations to the efficacy of the study. Translation
issues, security concerns, transportation, and most importantly the small scope possible in this study
have limited what has been possible for the author to address. This project was self-funded by the
author and travel expenses to the island of Moheli proved too high to conduct firsthand work.
However, because the project focused mainly on the tensions between Grande Comore and
Anjoaun the author believes that the lack of Mohelien voices does not compromise the validity of
the work. That lack does however deprive the work of insights from a portion of Comorian society
and cannot be ignored.
The scope of the project and selection of participants presented difficulties on several fronts.
Participants were selected on several criteria: French fluency was not required but basic literacy was
for the consent form, participants were to be at least 18 years old, participants had to agree to the
confidentiality waiver. While the author approached a number of Comorians who matched the
demographic criteria as set out in the proposal a number of Comorians were suggested by Peace
Corps volunteers and other community members based on their lived experience through many of
the events described. These volunteers and suggested candidates were then assessed for suitability
based on the initial lack of rural and female candidates.
Firstly, many of the participants in the surveys viewed the questions as a sort of exam and
several interested candidates refused to fill out the forms, not for any security concern but rather
that they were embarrassed to take an exam they were worried about failing. Because of the authors
role in the community as an educator many participants often had difficulty separating him from
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that role and his role as a researcher. There was also the persistent issue on the island of Grande
Comore, especially in rural communities, where candidates would accuse the author of being a
French or American spy and refuse to speak to him. The author had predicted that this might be an
issue and in his proposal for candidate selection decided to reach out through Peace Corps
volunteers already in those communities.
Relying on other Peace Corps volunteers to help find interested candidates in Grande
Comores presented several difficulties. First, roughly half of the interviewees requested that the
volunteer from their community remain present throughout the interview. Second, this resulted in a
potentially disproportionate number of more highly educated Comorian participants with 40% of
Anjoaunese and 35% of Grande Comorien interviewees having university degrees. Another Grande
Comore specific issue was the linguistic difference between the dialects between Grande Comore
and Anjoaun. As stated in his proposal the author simply used French, however it did negatively
affect the author’s ability to interview elderly candidates on that island.
Regarding the challenges presented by transportation the author was unfortunate in that one
of the two operating airlines between the islands shut down and made travel costs and schedules
prohibitively expensive. The rainy season of 2017 also compromised the authors ability to move
around the island of Anjoaun due to the severity of the damage to the island’s main road. Comoros
also suffers from longstanding issues with reliable electricity and internet/cellular connections which
provided a series of challenges to arranging suitable times to meet with and contact interested
candidates.
3.4 Researcher Subjectivity
The author acknowledges his biases and unique position in his community as both a Peace
Corps volunteer and a researcher. Throughout his service the author tried his utmost to integrate
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into his community through language, cultural events, and community engagement. However, this
does not change the fact that he is a white American man who was hosted for two years by a
Comorian family and community. His role as an educator, both in his English clubs and his work at
the secondary school, affected how he was viewed in his community and the connections he could
establish in his own community and across the country.
As a member of the first Peace Corps cohort in Comoros the author had to not only explain
what the mission of Peace Corps was he then had to explain his justifications for collecting data on
the Comorian political system and history. As mentioned earlier, the author dealt with many skeptics
and accusations of being involved in an intelligence agency. While the author was able to mitigate
many of these suspicions based on his integration and personal connections on Anjoaun there was a
higher level of scrutiny and skepticism on his work on Grande Comore. Furthermore, the author
must acknowledge his own personal bias towards Grande Comore after so long on Anjouan. In
discussions with colleagues on Grande Comore the author realized that he had framed several of the
questions regarding the 1997 crisis in a more pro-Anjouan light than he had intended. He does not
believe this has negatively impacted the quality of responses to those questions and received no
comments from interviewees that those questions were unfairly worded.
3.5 Inquiry Findings
The survey questions were designed to obtain information mostly about the differences in
subgroups opinions regarding the other islands, Comorian government, and France. The survey
contains 12 total questions, three Likert scale responses, three yes/no questions, and 6 written
response questions. These questions were designed in consultation with Peace Corps staff, the
authors Comorian colleagues, and his Capstone advisor to a mix of qualitative and quantitative data.
Although the author included one question about post-2001 topics (Question 2 Section 1 “How do
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you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001?) The author took care not to include any
questions regarding controversial topical events. One of the main goals of the research was to see
what the differences in how people learned of the events of 1997 and the emotions behind those
responses. The author had initially planned to include more detailed questions regarding the 2008
African Union military intervention, however that proved potentially risky for the author and
candidates and that topic was relegated to the literature review.
The full results from the surveys can be found in appendix one, however certain statistics
and quotations relevant to the findings will be offered in this section to contextualize some of the
differences and similarities between the two surveyed groups. Demographically the groups from
Grande Comore and Anjoaun varied in several ways. The average age of Anjoaunese participants
(40.6) is almost a decade older than Grande Comore’s (32.5.) The surveyed populations had similar
levels of education with 40% of Anjoaunese candidates and 35% of Grande Comoriens holding
university degrees. Both groups had 35% who had not completed Middle School level, however the
Anjoaunese group had one participant who had not studied after primary school and another who
reported no structured education whatsoever.
The cumulative response to the Likert Scale questions of Section One were generally the
same across both groups. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of the Anjoaunese group reported
having been to France or Mayotte with 45% of the Anjouan group responding “yes.” Interestingly
the rural and urban subgroups on Anjouan responded nearly identically with 40% and 50%
respectively reporting yes. This is starkly different to the numbers on Grande Comore where only
10% of rural participants reported visiting French territory contrasted to 62% of the urban
population. The author does not believe that the response of those urban subjects is representative
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of the larger urban population outside of the wealthier upper-class that were the majority urban
research participants.
Questions asking about the average sentiment to France on the 1-10 Likert Scale model
received predominantly low responses with an occasional higher outlying response. For example, the
first question in section 1 “How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros from 1975-2000?”
had an average response of 3.55 on Anjoaun but 30% of participants indicated scores of 5 or higher.
Most participants on both Anjoaun and Grande Comore selected responses to section one that were
between 1 and 4 on the Likert Scale.
Of the forty participants interviewed the author was only able to work with two elderly
women who had voted in the original independence referendum. Considering the ways in which the
French and Comorien authors approached this topic it was valuable to be able to include their
voices. The author had been hopeful of attracting more elderly participants to the project, but this
demographic group was especially reluctant to sign the confidentiality agreement.
The author was unsurprised to see that question four in section 2 (How did you hear about
the 1997 secession crisis of Anjoaun and Moheli?) received drastically different responses between
the islands. While only 20% of Anjoaunese reported unfamiliarity with the 1997 crisis, 45% of
Grande Comoriens had no idea that anything of import had happened. More than half of
Anjouanese participants (60%) indicated on question 6 that they believed the secession attempt was
justified as opposed to 15% of Grande Comore’s group. It must be noted that 20% of the Anjouan
group was unfamiliar or chose not to respond to question five while 40% of the Grande Comore
group were unfamiliar and 45% voted no.
It is unsurprising that the majority of responses to question five section one were negative
given the overall low scores on the Likert Scale question gaging general opinions on Franco-
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Comorian relations. Consistent across both islands and separate demographic groups the many
responses showcased some very strong emotions and claims.
The following excerpts are solely from participants who gave explicit verbal and written consent for
their submissions to be included in the final study and associated with their names.
Massondi Chamussidine, an Anjoaunese university student, felt that there was a bad relationship
between the French and Comorian governments because “the French government treated Comorians as
slaves.”
Patrice Keldi, an Anjoaunese chauffeur, feels that Comorian instability is attributable to France
Since it seized the independence of Comoros, France has pursued us with coup d’etats without
end. For Mahorais people who wanted independence but were not allowed to because of the
French military which is also surrounding our borders. All of the coups were able to progress
unchallenged because they were led by the French and the French citizen Bob Denard.
Allaoui Said Tourqui, a Peace Corps employee from Moroni, decried French interference as well
“France is such a hypocrite country and the Comorian government knows it. Wherever we have political instability
France is always behind it.”
Despite reaching out to several elderly Comorians old enough to have voted in the original
independence referendum only two participants accepted and gave the requisite permissions on the
confidentiality form. These women came form the same city as Ahmed Abdallah, the first president
following that vote. Both reported that they were forced to vote for independence under threat of
violence from the government. Interviews with both women were conducted in a mix of Shindzwani
and French at the participants request. However, when pressed for more details on the ways in
which they were pressured to vote and what they remembered of the immediate aftermath of the
vote neither woman offered much elaboration.
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In regards to the disparity of knowledge surrounding the events of 1997 between the
surveyed groups from Anjouan and Grande Comore the author has selected certain quotations from
participants who authorized the inclusion.
Mohammed Moutui, a professor from Mutsamudu (capital city of Anjoaun), responding to how he
heard about the events in 1997 responded
I participated in the radio and tv debates on TV Uhuru Anjoaun. I lived through the
demonstrations and the rumors of the strike and everyone who signed the separatists petition. I
participated in the protest that saw two men killed by Commander Mataba.
Daroussi Abdallah, a school administrator in the rural southern Anjoaunese town of Moya, reported
that he found out about the situation through a family tragedy.
I have an uncle who was assassinated during the crisis. I was in school and my school master was
told over the phone and came in and told me/us what happened.
As compared to those from Anjouan, the Grande Comorien responses were far less personal. Most
participants reported either unfamiliarity with the subject or learning about it in school.
Anturia Mihidaji, a nurse working in Moroni, responded that
I was young but I lived through the crisis. The crisis was however involving the island of
Anjouan only and what I lived here in Grande Comore was seeing people from Anjoaun being
chased out of their homes in Moroni by Ngazidja people.
The above response was unusual in several ways. As mentioned earlier, 45% of the Grande Comore
group reported either having forgotten or being unfamiliar with the 1997 crisis in general. On
Anjoaun only 20% reported unfamiliarity and those participants were elderly women who freely
admitted that they didn’t pay attention to politics. Even those Anjoaunese who did not know about
the new constitution (see below) had some sort of personal connection or general knowledge about
the crisis.
When asked about the efficacy of the new constitution and the establishment of the
Tournante the results on Grande Comore were split with 40% believing that the 2001 Constitution
was an equitable, if temporary, solution and 10% believed it wasn’t. There were just as many people
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surveyed on Grande Comore that weren’t aware of the new constitution’s existence as supported it.
On Anjouan the results were divided into thirds without a single sentiment taking precedence.
However, on both Anjouan and Grande Comore there was a clear divide between the urban and
rural populations with roughly 50% of surveyed urban participants on both islands choosing “yes.”
Retired Anjoaunese businessman Hamid Abasse remarked “at that period it was actually very good
but the situation has evolved so it [the Tournante] must change.” It must be noted that while
numerous interviewees called for the adjustment of the Tournante, none offered any potential
changes to it.
The last question on the survey, “do you believe there is conflict between the Comorian
islands,” yielded some fascinating discrepancies of opinion. An overwhelming 85% of Anjoaunese
participants believe there is conflict or tension, more than double the 40% of surveyed participants
from Grande Comore who believe the same. Responses from Grande Comore were also less likely
to paint a single side as an aggressor or solely at fault and instead focused on France or the structure
of the Tournante itself. Salim Chanfi, a student at the university of Comoros, responded
In my opinion I think we must first move away from France on an economic level and secondly
eliminate the Tournante and vote between islands for each candidate based on his strength and
not his island.
Halima Miradji, an English language instructor in Moroni, likened the situation to a family “just like
brothers and sisters, people argue and have its opinions” however she continued on to say “Though I don’t
think there is conflict between the islands.”
These responses are in stark contrast to those elicited from Anjoaunese participants. One
rural Anjoaunese participant who identified herself simply as Charfia responded as follows
There has never been stability because of problems with employment. These render us permanently
unhappy [Anjouan and Moheli] Also our language [Shindzwani] is insulted across the islands as they
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are separated. The Grande Comoriens violated the women of Anjouan in Moroni’s port and that insult
stays in our hearts. There will always be issues between us.

Arlette Kaembi, a shop owner in the southern Anjoaunese town Mremani simply wrote “the Grande
Comoriens must consider us [Anjoaunese] as Comorians too. They always treat us as lesser.”
Daroussi Abdallah, an Anjoaunese school administrator, blamed the structure of the Tournante
itself
There is always conflict because of political intrigues. Written into the Tournante is a course that
pushes those in power to benefit their own island at the expense of the others. This is what
makes the Tournante so fragile. Basically, the Tournante exists to give the chance to each island
governor to alleviate some of the hate between Comorians.
These quotations have been drawn solely from the written responses to the questions in Appendix
A, and many of those responses would have been significantly longer had the author allotted more
space to write. Almost every survey also resulted in a longer one on one talk with the participants
where they expanded on their opinions. The level of negativity against France was unsurprising,
however the author was surprised at the disparity of the responses between islands regarding the
other islands. It seemed that to participants from Grande Comore the events on Anjouan were so
distant they may as well have been in a different country. This is in stark contrast to the Anjoaunese
responses which brought about strong emotions and several times noticeable anger.
Section 4: Through the Lens of Vamik Volkan and Johan Galtung
4.1 The Division of Comorian Group Identity
Geographically, culturally, and linguistically, all four islands in the Comorian archipelago
share a high degree of homogeneity. In the author’s lived experience on the islands he heard
countless times that the island dialects are mutually intelligible and that the Chaifite Islam binds
Comoros together. Even Shimaore, the native dialect of Mayotte, is easily understood by advanced
speakers of the other dialects. But in the forty years since Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli left
France, the three islands have held a lingering resentment about Mayotte. However there exists a
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historical power disequilibrium between the larger islands, Grande Comore and Anjouan, and the
smaller of the four, Moheli and Mayotte.
Colonized by France over the second half of the 18th century, Mayotte was the first to come
under the French flag in 1841. Although all four islands were ruled as an extension of the prefecture
of Madagascar, Comoros was granted semi-autonomous rule after the Second World War.
Dzaoudzi, Mayotte’s capital, was chosen as the seat of the Comorian presidency and legislature.
However, in 1960, the capital was shifted to Moroni (Halifa, 2009). This perhaps is the single most
significant event in pinpointing when and where public sentiment on Mayotte pulled away from the
Comorian identity and sought protection in the French identity. Mayotte’s historical fears of
subjugation by Grande Comore were realized in the power grab by the Moroni wakabaila. In his
work Blind Trust, Vamik Volkan posits that large-group identity as it incorporates ethnic, religious, or
national identities is irrevocably linked to a “core” identity which include the totality of an
individuals lived experiences (Volkan, 2004). Volkan goes on to say that most of the time “we are
not even aware of this link until our large-group identity is threatened…” (Volkan, 2004).
In stereotypes and prejudices that date back to the pre-colonial Comorian sultanates there
exists a divide between those of Arab descent and those of Bantu origin. The Wakabaila claim
Middle Eastern heritage and those noble houses have dominated Comorian religious and
bureaucratic posts for generations. The Wamatsaha, predominantly of East African origins are
farmers and craftsmen. The Wamatsaha are the descendants of slaves and after decades of work
have begun forming a commercially oriented middle class. But it is the historic domination of
Wakabaila in the urban centers of Anjoaun and Grande Comore that have maintained dominance
first through their connections to the Arab world and then through the connection to the French
metropole beginning after the First World War. Ethnicity, according to Volkan “incorporates
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religion as well as language; connected with shared images of the groups history, it establishes an
especially sharp sense of “us” and “them.” (Volkan, 2004). The language surrounding the divisions
between the islands is one
But the manifestation of inter-island prejudices has evolved beyond colonial roots. Each
island holds negative stereotypes of the others. Anjoaunese are crazy and violent, Grande
Comoriens are arrogant and lazy, Mohelien are just lazy. And while Grande Comore and Anjouan
fought for dominance over the archipelago throughout the 1960’s, Mayotte and Moheli were fearful
of that domination (Halifa, 2009). So, while the present-day Union of Comoros has experienced a
resurgence of fundamentalist Islam, Mahorais have spent decades moving towards the secularism so
long embraced by France. Polygamy was outlawed in Mayotte in 2004 while the island was still
considered a TOM under its own unique set of laws (Bouhet, 2017).
The idea of a collective Comorian identity cannot be looked at without acknowledging the
loss of Mayotte. The trauma to the other three islands has perversely morphed from the initial
outrage of the 1970’s. Mayotte is seen as a sort of El Dorado and tens of thousands of Comorians,
especially Anjoaunese, have attempted the perilous voyage for a better life in Mayotte. There exists a
disconnect between the stated desire to reintegrate Mayotte into the Comorian Union and the desire
for a higher standard of life. On the Mahorais’ side of the equation there exists a very real fear of
domination by Comoros. However, that fear has evolved from a fear of suppression by Moroni to a
fear of being overwhelmed by Anjoaunese immigrants. This fear led nearly half of Mahorais to vote
for Marine Le Pen in the 2016 French presidential election (Le Monde, 2016). Le Pen visited the
island early that year, campaigning on promises of a crackdown on illegal immigration.
Volkan distinguishes seven threads that compose large group identity:
1. Shared, tangible reservoirs for images associated with positive emotion
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2. Shared “good” identifications
3. Absorption of others “bad” qualities
4. Absorption of (revolutionary or transforming) leaders’ internal worlds
5. Chosen glories
6. Chosen traumas
7. Formation of symbols that develop their own autonomy (Volkan, 2004)
Within the framework of these threads one of the most damaging elements of Mayotte’s
“Frenchness” is the failure to adhere to the mythic past narrative of Comorian Islam. The adoption
of French secularism and the abandonment of the powerful symbol of Mtsa Mwandze traveling to
Saudi Arabia and bringing back the holy Qur’an is an insult to Comorian heritage.
The geopolitical realities of the Mayotte situation, from Cold War fears to shipping lanes,
have made the Comorian demand of a four-island state impossible. Since Mayotte’s upgrade to the
101st département d'outre-mer, Dzaoudzi is just as French as Lyon. But the continued separation will
continue to exacerbate relations between the other islands simply because of the damage to the
integrity of the Comorian identity. The islands have been forced to see themselves not as members
of a single group, but as a single group that has been forcibly divided. And when the unifying bonds
have been so definitively injured they can be exploited by internal and external forces against
themselves and each other.
4.2 The Three R’s Applied to the Fomboni Accords
The 1997 secessionist crisis was unusual in not only the goals of the separatists but also the
conduct of all parties involved. After the initial foray by government forces where fifty soldiers were
killed in Mutsamudu, there was a distinct absence of direct violence in the form of armed conflict. In
his work on reconciliation Johan Galtung observes that “it is the failure to transform conflict that
leads to violence.” (Galtung, 1998). This research has addressed some of the structural violence that
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Anjouan and Moheli used to justify the secession attempt. But why was there such a lack of direct
violence considering the length of the crisis and the willingness to use violence? And considering the
stressors to the process, what successes can be attributed to these processes?
Of the three “R’s” put forth by Galtung (reconstruction after direct violence, reconciliation
of conflict parties, and resolution of underlying root conflict) the 1997 Comorian crisis and its
ramifications up through the 2008 AU intervention to remove Mohammed Bacar, the most relevant
are the latter two. Because of the lack of direct violence there was effectively no post-conflict
reconstruction that the parties deemed necessary. The reconciliatory process as led by ambassadors
Yere and Madeira took the almost six years to finalize the fine details in the Beit Salam agreement.
With the commitment of the OAU, OIF, LAS, UN, and other international partners the appropriate
economic pressures were applied to bring the disparate Comorian parties to the table.
Once Ahmed Abdallah Sambi was elected and the 2008 Anjoaun crisis was resolved via AU
military intervention it could be argued that a lasting negative peace had been achieved. Galtung
categorizes peace to generally mean “the capacity to handle conflicts with empathy, nonviolence,
and creativity” (Galtung, 1998). But it would be difficult to assert that there has ever more than a
negative peace, absence of direct violence, between Anjouan and Grande Comore.
“When violence breaks out there are usually two structural causes: too much dominance… or too
much distance… Combine the two and we get the phenomenon known as (social) exclusion or
marginalization.” (Ibid.)
The relationship between the Comorian islands since the final days of their colonial period has been
one of fearing marginalization by the others. Thus, it is only with the acknowledgement of this
struggle for dominance that progress can be made. The Tournante began to address this issue, and
in Galtung’s 3R theory the best way to address the perceived inequality is to use a structure-oriented
perspective:
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converts the relation from inter-personal, or inter-state/nation, to a relation between two
positions in a deficient structure. If the parties can agree that the structure was/is deficient and
that their behavior was an enactment of structural positions rather than anything more personal,
then turning together against the common problem, the structural violence, should be possible.
(Ibid.)
The different stages taken in drafting the Antananarivo Accords, the Fomboni Accords, the 2001
Constitution, and the Beit Salam Agreement, all focused on finding a way to reintegrate the
Comorian islands into a single system where it never felt that one was preeminent over the others.
In the sixteen years since the establishment of the Tournante a several important shifts must
be taken into account. While the legitimacy Azali Assoumani’s first election in 2002 may be debated
the fact that since the election of Ahmed Abdallah Sambi Comoros has transitioned power twice
without accusations of voter fraud or any direct violence. For a country plagued with instability and
long stretches of autocracy, the process by which the average Comorian can start to feel that their
vote matters has begun. The long process of ratifying the newest constitution has offered a potential
avenue forward to the next chapter in Comorian politics: the conversation has been reoriented so
that faults are distributed around islands and local leaders rather than solely at France. Even if
leaders take advantage of the Tournante and constitutional framework to push policies more
amenable for their native island they are using the legal framework as set out in the Tournante. The
amount of progress cannot be denied, and as the Tournante begins its second cycle through the
islands it may become necessary to adjust the framework once again. Despite this, Comoros is finally
beginning to establish precedents for non-violent solutions and fair elections. And as the islands
continue to develop and seek economic opportunities that foundation will prove invaluable to
overcome whatever political hurdles present themselves.
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Section 5: Conclusions
5.1 Comoros Moving Forward
Between the months of August and November the entire island of Anjouan smells of cloves.
Known as nkarafou, the spices are left to dry on tarps until they are ready to be bagged in old rice
sacks and sent by bus to an exporter in Mutsamudu. Every evening fishermen are greeted by a
crowd of children who help them pull their fiberglass boats up the beach for the evening. Those
same children will then run down the street pulling scuffed red sardine cans they have fixed wheels
to on a little string. Men of all ages will sit in the local bangwé and play dominos with so much
enthusiasm they run the risk of shattering the tiles. The mosque will sound the call to prayer and old
men will stroll with their arms clasped behind their back, animatedly chatting with their companions.
The islands of the moon. Home to the largest active volcano in the world and a marine park
that surrounds almost the entire circumference of Moheli. These are islands that have seen
colonizers and traders from every corner of the world. From Malagasy pirates to Portuguese
explorers in days past to Chinese engineers and American Peace Corps volunteers. A culture that
insists on hospitality and generosity. Comoros is an oft-forgotten and little-known nation but it is
one that is unforgettable.
But these idyllic islands have tension beneath the surface that will not dissipate any time
soon. The cultural trauma of losing their sister island of Mayotte and the indignities suffered under
the mercenary regimes have left the tensions between the islands simmering just under the surface.
The author vividly remembers tensions running high in early 2017 when Anjouan accused Grande
Comore of withholding parts from the Saudi donated generators. While even remote villages in
Grande Comore had twenty-four hour a day electricity, the capital of Anjouan would be lucky to see
the lights turn on at all on a given day. The author heard many genuinely concerning rumors
throughout the island about Anjouan’s place within the union.
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In attempting to provide not only a detailed timeline and context to the 1997 secession crisis
the author hopes that the limited scope of the in-person surveys conducted has shed some light on
the attitudes of everyday Comorians. The author believes that the divide between Grande Comorien
and Anjoaunese surveys responses is indicative of a larger trend in which Anjoaun still holds a
grudge against Grande Comore while those on Grande Comore do not understand the potential
reasons for Anjouan’s ire.
This is not to call into question the strides forward taken in the last sixteen years nor the
successes in the mediative processes in establishing the Tournante. While the period between 1975
and 2001 was rife with structural violence and political instability Comoros is currently in a period
that has seen some marked improvements. With the end of the Cold War and Apartheid the
interferences of France and South Africa have drastically declined. The Tournante has completed a
full cycle, and since the ouster of Mohammed Bacar there have been no military coups and the last
three elections are recognized by the international community as legitimate.
Since Mayotte became a full-fledged department the likelihood of a four island Comorian state
is effectively impossible. Despite this, thousands of Comorians attempt the perilous voyage to
Mayotte seeking economic opportunities. Accusations of corruption plague every state-run agency
and civil servant salaries often go months in arrears. Identity politics are more relevant than ever
with the island of Anjouan seeing a resurgence in conservative Sunni Islam, a consequence of which
has been the targeting of the small Shia minority. President Azali has been accused of trying to stifle
opposition parties and neglecting the needs of Anjouan and Moheli.
So, what can be done moving forward? In the authors opinion the Tournante is the most
effective solution to inter-island power dynamics. The number one concern needs to be the
invitation of international investors and offering economic incentives for Comorians to stay within
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the archipelago rather than move to France or West Africa. Telma, a telecom company based in
Madagascar, began offering services in Comoros in mid-2016 and began a massively successful
campaign which lowered rates and increased services. Social services, if they are offered equally, will
help alleviate interisland tensions. As mentioned above the delay in getting Anjouan’s new
generators had the potential to escalate dramatically. But once the generators were installed and the
three islands were once again on a level field the general sentiments became less hostile. The class
resentment between wakabaila and wamatsaha is unlikely to change anytime soon, but if more civil
servants are paid on time then the establishment of a middle class can help to offset that. Comoros
is a victory for mediative diplomacy, and the processes used took time and patience. But it is only
through taking the time and being patient that progress is made.

44
Section 6: Appendices and References
6.1 Appendix A: Questions on the Survey Form (Modified)
Section 1
1. How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros from 1975-2000? (1 is very negative, 10
is very positive) Que pensez-vous des actions de la France dans les Comores de 1975 à 2000?
(1 est très négatif, 10 est très positif)
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10
2. How do you feel about France's actions in Comoros post-2001? (1 is very negative, 10 is
very positive) Que pensez-vous des actions de la France dans les Comores après 2001? (1 est
très négatif, 10 est très positif)
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10
3. Have you ever been to France or Mayotte? Avez-vous déjà été en France où Mayotte?
[ yes / no ]

[ oui / non ]

4. How do you feel about the relationship between the French government and the Comorian
government? (1 is very negative, 10 is very positive)
Que pensez-vous de la relation entre le gouvernement français et le gouvernement
Comorien? (1 est très négatif, 10 est très positif)
1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...10
5. Please provide one or two reasons for how you responded to the previous question.
Veuillez fournir une ou deux raisons pour lesquelles vous avez répondu à la question
précédente.
Section 2
1. Did you vote in the 1975 referendum on independence from France?
Avez-vous voté lors du référendum de 1975 sur l'indépendance de la France?
[ yes / no ] [ oui / non ]
2. How did you hear about the results of the referendum?
Comment avez-vous entendu parler des résultats du référendum?
3. If you are too young to remember the referendum or were born afterwards, how did you
learn about it? (For example at school or through a family member) Si vous êtes trop jeune
pour vous souvenir du référendum ou est né après, comment avez-vous appris à ce sujet?
(Par exemple à l'école ou par l'intermédiaire d'un membre de la famille)
4. How did you hear about the 1997 secession crisis of Anjoaun and Moheli? Comment avezvous entendu parler de la crise de sécession de 1997 de Anjoaun et Moheli?
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5. Do you think the Anjoaunese and Mohelian separatists were justified in their goals? Pensezvous que les séparatistes Anjoaunais et Mohéliens étaient justifiés dans leurs objectifs?
[ yes / no ] [ oui / non ]
6. Do you feel that the 2001 Constitution was a fair and balanced way to resolve the issues
between the islands? Considérez-vous que la Constitution de 2001 était une manière
équitable et équilibrée de résoudre les problèmes entre les îles?

7. Do you believe there is conflict or tension between the Comorian Islands? If yes, please
write what you believe the major issues to be. Croyez-vous qu'il y ait conflit ou tension entre
les îles Comoriennes? Si oui, écrivez ce que vous croyez les grands problèmes à résoudre.
[ yes / no ] [ oui / non ]
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6.2 Appendix B: Full Text of Confidentiality Agreement

Consent Form/Formulaire de consentement
Constitutional Reform: The Decolonization Process in the Comoros Islands
Nicholas A. Daou, SIT Graduate Institute, Brattleboro, Vermont, United States
Instructions:
Please read the following statements carefully and mark your preferences where indicated. Signing below indicates your
agreement with all statements and your voluntary participation in the study. Signing below while failing to mark a
preference where indicated will be interpreted as a negative preference. Please ask the researcher if you have any
questions regarding this consent form.
Veuillez lire attentivement les énoncés suivants et indiquer vos préférences, le cas échéant. La signature ci-dessous
indique votre accord avec toutes les déclarations et votre participation volontaire à l'étude. Le fait de signer ci-dessous
tout en omettant de marquer une préférence lorsque cela est indiqué sera interprété comme une préférence negatif.
Veuillez demander au chercheur si vous avez des questions concernant ce formulaire de consentement.
________________________________________________________________________
I am aware that this interview is conducted by an independent graduate researcher with the goal of
analyzing opinions about Comorian history and the Comorian Constitution of 2001.
Je sais que cette interview est menée par un chercheur diplômé indépendant dans le but d'analyser
les opinions sur l'histoire comorienne et les constitution Comorien de 2001.
I am aware that the information I provide is for research purposes only. I understand that my
responses will be confidential and that my name will not be associated with any results of this study
unless I give my explicit approval to the researcher.
Je suis conscient que les renseignements que je fournis sont uniquement à des fins de recherche. Je
comprends que mes réponses seront confidentielles et que mon nom ne sera associé à aucun résultat
de cette étude à moins que je donne mon approbation explicite au chercheur.
I am aware that I have the right to refuse to answer any question and to terminate my participation
at any time, and that the researcher will answer any questions I have about the study.
Je sais que j'ai le droit de refuser de répondre à toute question et de mettre fin à ma participation à
tout moment, et que le chercheur répondra à toutes les questions que j'ai sur l'étude.
I am aware of and take full responsibility for any risk, physical, psychological, legal, or social,
associated with participation in this study. Please feel free to ask the researcher any questions you
may have on the possible risks associated with this study.
Je suis conscient et je suis entièrement responsable des risques physiques, psychologiques, juridiques ou
sociaux liés à la participation à cette étude. N'hésitez pas à demander au chercheur toutes les questions que
vous pourriez avoir sur les risques éventuels associés à cette étude.

I am aware that I will not receive monetary compensation for participation in this study, but a copy
of the final study will be made available to me upon request. (The final project will only be available
in English)
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Je suis conscient que je ne recevrai pas de compensation monétaire pour participer à cette étude, mais une
copie de l'étude finale sera mise à ma disposition sur demande. (Le projet final ne sera disponible qu'en
anglais)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

I [ have / have not ] read and understood this document.
[ J’ai / Je n’ai pas ] lu et compris ce document.
I [ do / do not ] give the researcher permission to use my name in the final study.
Je [ donner / ne pas donner ] au chercheur la permission d'utiliser mon nom dans l'étude finale.
I [ do / do not ] give the researcher permission to use my age, gender, location, occupation, and
educational information in the final study.
Je [ donner / ne pas donner ] au chercheur la permission d'utiliser mon âge, sexe, location,
occupation, et information éducatif dans l'étude finale.
Date/Dat :__________________

Participant’s Signature:
Signature de Participant:

Thank you for participating!
Merci pour votre participation!
Questions, comments, concerns,
and requests for the final written
study can be directed to:
Les questions, les commentaires,
les plaintes et les demandes
d'étude écrite finale peuvent être
adressées à:
Nicholas Daou
Telephone 360-01-37
Email: nicholas.daou@mail.sit.edu
pcvnadcomoros@gmail.com

Participant’s Printed Name:
Nom Imprimé du Participant :

Researcher’s Signature:
Signature de Chercheur :
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6.3 Appendix C: Aggregate Information Collected Through Surveys

Grande Comore
Permission 1 Granted: 100%
Permission 2 Granted: 65%
Permission 3 Granted: 90%
Education Levels:
University: 35% (7 Participants)

Some Primary School: 0%

BAC (High School Completed) 15% (3 Participants)

None: 0%

Some High School: 15% (3 Participants)

N/A: 15% (3 Participants)

Some Middle School: 20% (4 Participants)

Section 1
Question 1 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros 75-01 (Likert Scale)]
Average: 3.25

Rural: 2.8

Men: 3.5

Urban: 3.9

Women: 2.8

Question 2 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001 (Likert Scale)]
Total: 3.2

Rural: 2.6

Men: 3.25

Urban: 3.9

Women: 3

Question 3 (positive responses only) [Have you ever been to Mayotte/France]
Total: 35%

Rural: 10%

Men: 50%

Urban: 62%

Women: 12%

N/A: 5%
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Question 4 [How do you feel about the relationship between the French and Comorian governments?]
Total: 3.5

Rural: 2.25

Men: 3.6

Urban: 5

Women: 2.8

Section 2
Question 1 [Did you vote in the 1975 Independence Referendum?]
Total: 0%

Urban: 0%

Men: 0%

Rural: 0%

Women: 0%

Question 2 [(If yes to question 1) How did you hear about results?]
Government: 0%

N/A: 100%

Question 3 [(If no to question 1) How did you hear about results?]
Family: 35%

School: 40%

Radio: 5%

Community: 10%

Participated: 0%

N/A: 0%

Unfamiliar: 10%

Question 4 [How did you hear about 1997 Crisis?]
Family: 15%

School: 0%

Radio: 15%

Community: 15%

Participated: 0%

N/A: 10%

Unfamiliar: 45%
Question 5 [Do you think the actions of separatists were justified?]
Yes total: 15%

No Total: 45%

Yes Urban: 12.5%

No Urban: 62.5%

Yes Rural: 16.6%

No Rural: 41.6%
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Unfamiliar: 40%

N/A: 0%

Question 6 [Do you think 2001 Constitution is a fair way to resolve issues between islands?]
Yes Total: 40%

No Total: 10%

Temporary Yes: 15%

Yes Urban: 50%

No Urban: 12.5%

Unfamiliar: 25%

Yes Rural: 16.6%

No Rural: 8%

N/A: 5%
Forgot: 15%

[Temporary yes averaged in with total yes]
Question 7 [Do you believe there is conflict between islands?]
Yes Total: 40%

No Total: 60%

Yes Urban: 25%

No Urban: 75%

Yes Rural: 50%

No Rural: 50%

Yes Male: 33%

No Male: 66%

Yes Female: 50%

No Female: 50%

Anjoaun
Permission 1 Granted: 100%
Permission 2 Granted: 95%
Permission 3 Granted: 95%
Education Levels:
University: 40% (8 Participants)

Some Primary School: 5% (1 Participant)

BAC (High School Completed) 20% (4 Participants)

None: 5% (1 Participant)

Some High School: 10% (2 Participants)

N/A: 5% (Participant)

Some Middle School: 15% (3 Participants)

Section 1
Question 1 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros 75-01 (Likert Scale)]
Average: 3.2

Rural: 2.8

Men: 4

Urban: 3

Women: 2.5
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Question 2 [How do you feel about France’s actions in Comoros post-2001 (Likert Scale)]
Total: 5.8

Rural: 3.1

Men: 3.5

Urban: 2.2

Women: 1.9

Question 3 (positive responses only) [Have you ever been to Mayotte/France]
Total: 45%

Rural: 40%

Men: 66%

Urban: 50%

Women: 27%

Question 4 [How do you feel about the relationship between the French and Comorian governments?]
Total: 3.4

Rural: 4.1

Men: 4.8

Urban: 2.3

Women: 2.2

Section 2
Question 1 [Did you vote in the 1975 Independence Referendum?]
Total: 10%

Urban: 20%

Men: 0%

Rural: 0%

Women: 18%

Question 2 [(If yes to question 1) How did you hear about results?]
Government: 10%

N/A: 90%

Question 3 [(If no to question 1) How did you hear about results?]
Family: 30%

School: 40%

Radio: 5%

Community: 5%

Participated: 10%

N/A: 20%

Unfamiliar: 0%
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Question 4 [How did you hear about 1997 Crisis?]
Family: 25%

School: 10%

Radio: 0%

Community: 20%

Participated: 20%

N/A: 5%

Unfamiliar: 20%

Question 5 [Do you think the actions of separatists were justified?]
Yes total: 60%

No Total: 20%

Yes Urban: 60%

No Urban: 5%

Yes Rural: 60%

No Rural: 10%

Unfamiliar: 15%

N/A: 5%

Question 6 [Do you think 2001 Constitution is a fair way to resolve issues between islands?]
Yes Total: 35%

No Total: 30%

Temporary Yes: 10%

Yes Urban: 50%

No Urban: 5%

Unfamiliar: 30%

Yes Rural: 10%

No Rural: 25%

N/A: 5%

[Temporary yes averaged in with total yes]
Question 7 [Do you believe there is conflict between islands?]
Yes Total: 85%

No Total: 10%

Yes Urban: 80%

No Urban: 20%

Yes Rural: 95%

No Rural: 0%

N/A: 5%

Notes:
•
•
•
•

Question 6 Section 2 averages temporary yes with total yes because of prevalence of the response
The author only found two participants who had voted in the initial referendum in 1974 willing to declare their
age
Several participants who declined to give full permissions agreed to provide some general info while
withholding name and location
Urban and Rural results are averaged from within that subsection rather than the total sample population from
the island group
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